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Summary. This study analyzes the current state of legislation pertaining to pharmaceutical/health care in a 
period of normative ferment characterized by continuous changes, after countless discussions that have been 
held on a proposed constitutional reform (rejected by the will of the people at the end of 2016). After a gen-
eral reflection on the division of legislative powers between the State and its Regions, in the light of attempts 
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as historic, approval of the new Essential Levels of Care (LEC), the approval of the 2017 Budget Law (con-
cerning important items such as the purchase of drugs), until we reach the Draft Law on competition which 
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H e a l t h  s y s t e m  r e s e a r c h  -  O r i g i n a l  a r t i c l e
It is best to fidget in doubt,
that be still in error. 
(A. Manzoni)
Introduction: healthcare, sub specie pharmaceutical,
after the rejection of the proposed constitutional 
reform
On December 4, 2016, the Italian people voted 
against the proposed constitutional reform adopted by 
Parliament on April 12, 2016. 
This paper presents an analysis of some profiles 
within the pharmaceutical system which are function-
ally connected to the health service in order to under-
stand how the latter might have been affected by the 
proposed reform, in this manner bringing about the 
current state of affairs. The pharmaceutical service is 
obviously relevant to public service, being responsible 
for implementing the fundamental right to health as 
set out in art. 32 of the Italian Constitution. In specie, 
the right of access to medication, free from limitations 
imposed by income and place of residence, is an ex-
pression of the sacrosanct right of every citizen to lead 
a dignified life. 
Art. 32 Const. is clear on this point: it is the duty 
of the State to protect health both as an individual right 
and a collective interest. The right to health therefore 
has a composite nature, as it is a right and also the 
freedom to cure oneself, but in one’s endeavours to do 
so also encompasses the right to expect to be assisted 
by the State. It is no coincidence that, in accordance 
with art. 3 Const., it is the duty of the State to remove 
all economic and social barriers that hinder, in breach 
of citizens’ equality, the full development of the human 
being. Therefore, there is no doubt that pharmaceutical 
care, just as healthcare in general, is a public service 
of general interest. In fact, the State has created the 
National Health Service (NHS), a vehicle which pro-
vides pharmaceutical care under the supervision of the 
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Regions (which is also healthcare thanks to the advent 
of multi-service pharmacies), functioning throughout 
the nation by means of public and private pharmacies. 
The regionalization of pharmaceutical care (and 
healthcare in general) started in the 90s with the so-
called Bassanini reform (1). The idea was to progres-
sively bring legislation and administrational practices 
towards the requirements of local communities. This 
process of decentralization is known to have reached 
its peak with the full adoption of the principle of sub-
sidiarity (2), as regulated in the Constitution (art. 118 
Const.), though European inputs (first acknowledged 
in the Maastricht Treaty) must not be forgotten. The 
State’s exclusive right to exercise sovereign authority 
has not historically been very fruitful and, moreover, 
has never been appreciated by the community, which 
has often felt neglected, and even abandoned, by the 
very State. With the adoption of Constitutional Law 
no. 3, October 18, 2001, the federalist reform of the 
order was carried out; this reform can mostly be noted 
in the revision of Title V of the Constitution, which 
deals with the division of powers between the State 
and Regions.
The division of power between the State and 
Regions: the current situation
It is known that it is the State’s exclusive respon-
sibility to determine the “essential levels of perfor-
mances concerning civil and social rights”, in order to 
ensure their even application throughout the country. 
The Regions and the autonomous Provinces of Trento 
and Bolzano, on the other hand, are responsible for the 
“protection of health” on matters covered by concur-
rent legislation. 
Regarding pharmaceutical care and its peculiar 
“two-faced”, legal nature, being both a general pub-
lic service and a business and commercial enterprise, 
other aspects can be noted: “protection against unfair 
competition”, which is exclusively the responsibility of 
the State and “trade” which, in the absence of detailed 
specifications, is attributable on a residual basis to re-
gional powers (3).
If the analysis then focuses on two specific ele-
ments of pharmaceutical care, such as the management 
of public pharmacies and the distribution of medicinal 
products, we note that “local finance” also assumes a 
certain importance. This, again on a residual basis, is 
attributable to the exclusive power of the Regions and 
the autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano. In 
this last respect, art. 119 Const. declares the financial 
autonomy of local authorities in terms of revenue and 
expenditure, to enable them to fund the public func-
tions attributed to them. 
In this way, legislative jurisdiction is split between 
the State and Regions, implying as anticipated the 
existence of a “waterfall” or “drop down” system. This 
includes administrative functions, which are exercised 
in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity, dif-
ferentiation and adequacy as set out in art. 118 Const.
 Thus, State and Regions (along with the prov-
inces, municipalities and metropolitan cities) are on an 
equal footing (art. 114 Const.), being equally neces-
sary to the existence and continuity of the legal system. 
Therefore, their legal relationship must follow proto-
cols based on the principle of loyal cooperation and 
respect for the areas in which they possess legislative 
and organizational autonomy. 
Finally, it should be noted that art. 120 Const. 
provides for the Government to take the place of lo-
cal authorities in order to ensure legal and economic 
unity and guarantee the aforementioned civil and so-
cial rights. 
In the case of the latter parameter, even the gov-
ernment’s power to act in place of a local authority 
(governed by Law June 5, 2003, no. 131, and in truth 
rarely applied) guarantees the fluidity of the distribu-
tion of power. 
In particular, if the “essential levels of perfor-
mance” is a mobile parameter that regulates the re-
sponsibility attributed to certain powers (and not only 
this, as we will see shortly), the power of substitution 
does not affect institutional titles, but only the con-
crete exercise of the powers that are and remain the 
responsibility of local authorities (in fact, the imple-
menting legislation mentioned above provides for local 
authorities to compensate for their inertia by initiating 
the process of substitution). In fact, both parameters, 
in opening and closing the system dividing power be-
tween the State and Regions, have shown themselves 
to be mechanisms aimed at achieving a similarity rath-
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er than an absolute conformity of services (for pur-
poses of the present study, in the field of healthcare). 
The proposals of the rejected constitutional reform
The proposed reform aimed to make changes 
to all of the parts of the constitution cited above in 
a “state-centric”sense (4). In fact, the reform would 
have brought many powers that are currently shared 
between State the Regions under exclusive power of 
the State, effectively eliminating art. 117 Const. which 
is responsible for separating these powers. The reform 
therefore listed the matters that fell within the exclu-
sive power of the State and those that came within the 
exclusive power of the Regions. 
It is noticeable that the State has tried to include, 
as well as the power to determine, “essential levels 
of care”, “the general and common principles for the 
protection of health, social policies and food securi-
ty” in its exclusive competence; while “planning and 
organization of health and social services” was given 
to the Regions. Likewise, the State would have kept 
an exclusive competence in the field of competition, 
while giving a broader meaning to the term as it is cur-
rently used: if the referendum had passed, the State 
would have been responsible for issues relating to 
the”protection” and “promotion” of competition.
The reform did not, however, go into detail on this 
matter, except for including a residual clause stating 
that any matters not falling under the competence of 
the State was to be included in Regional competences: 
trade and local finance remained in the competence of 
the Regions.
Clarification is urgently needed on both matters.
Regarding trade, the reform specifically provided 
that, in compliance with art. 117 Const., “local eco-
nomic development” fell under the exclusive compe-
tence of the Regions and this point clashed with the 
provisions on competition.
However, when it came to local finance, a provi-
sion giving “upstream” control to the State had been 
added to art. 119 Const. (this provision is a symbol of 
the autonomy given to local authorities): according to 
the reform, reference indicators of costs and require-
ments had to be defined by State law, in order to per-
mit the local authority to carry out its financial func-
tions efficiently. 
An addition which was certainly dictated by the 
need to contain public spending, an issue which has 
never been concealed by any reformist legislator (even 
when it comes to protecting the right to health), with 
the aim of putting brakes on the Regions’ excessive 
spending habits, especially when it comes to health-
care. 
Furthermore, in terms of competences art. 117 
Const. provides for an equality of functions: regula-
tory functions would be exercised in accordance with 
respective legislative powers. 
Certainly, it appears contradictory that the reform 
did not set out a more effective amendment to art. 118 
Const.: in fact, irrespective of a few additions, this ar-
Table 1. Conventional pharmaceutical spending. Trends observed from 2010-2016 (5)
Year no. prescriptions Prescriptions/ no. packages of Packages/citizen Net pharmaceutical National Health
 (in millions) citizen medicines withdrawn from expenditure charged Service: net contracted
  (average no.)   pharmacy by SSN (National pharmaceutical
    (average no.) Health Service) expenditure (trend% 
      compared to the 
      previous year)
2016 ~587  9.7 ~1.12 billion 18.5   8.445.620.272 -1.3
2015 ~596 9.8 ~850 million 14   8.655.142.395 -1.4
2014 ~609 10 ~1.121 billion 18.4   8.774.668.314 -3.1
2013 ~607 10.19 ~1.118 billion 18.7   9.058.020.186 -2.5
2012 ~591 ~10 ~1.88 billion 18   9.290.529.550 -9.1
2011 ~590 ~10 ~1.80 billion 18 10.217.246.769 -8.6
2010 ~587 9.84 ~1.73 billion 18 11.174.399.155 -0.7
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ticle had kept its reference to the principle of subsidi-
arity, differentiation and adequacy that was actually in 
disagreement with the reform’s “state-centric” intent. 
Presumably, the constitutional legislator could not 
have done otherwise, given existent Community ob-
ligations in this matter (3), and the self-imposed limit 
in the reform’s attempt to make changes to articles 116 
and 117 Const. seems to agree with this reasoning. 
Reference is made to the provision set out in art. 
117 Const., according to which the State’s power to 
delegate the exercise of regulatory functions in mat-
ters which are under its exclusive competence to the 
Regions was maintained. Rather, the reformed art. 
116 Const. made it possible for the Regions, provided 
their budgets were balanced (reaffirming the need to 
the contain public spending), after consulting the local 
authorities in accordance with a State law, to apply for 
legislative powers in specific fields, including the field 
relating to “general and common provisions for social 
policies”, to be given to them.
Finally, a safeguard clause could be found within 
art. 117 Const., according to which the State could 
“intervene” in matters which did not come under their 
exclusive legislative competence, whenever the Repub-
lic’s economic or legal integrity called for it, or when it 
was in the National interest to do so. However, as the 
reference to the substitutional power addressed in art. 
120 Const. (which proposed the possibility of request-
ing a reply from the Senate within a specific period of 
time, after which the government could still exercise 
its substitutional power) had not been deleted, it is 
not clear what this power of intervention would have 
consisted of (would it have subtracted entitlement or 
merely the practical use of power?), although the fact 
that a statutory reserve remains is a small comfort. 
Given the above, it is reasonable to wonder if this 
kind of reform would have brought about hoped-for 
savings and a reduction in conflicts of legal compe-
tence at least in the field of healthcare. 
Achieving uniform healthcare in the country is 
certainly desirable, and also helps combat the distress-
ing practice of “health tourism”, which arises from 
existing differences between the Regions, created by 
years of confused federalism.
However, it is hard to understand how the reform 
proposes to differentiate between the determination of 
“general and common provisions” by the State and the 
“programming” (in particular) and “organization” of 
health and social services on the part of the Regions.
After all, is the need for national uniformity not 
already guaranteed by the power of the State to deter-
mine basic levels pertaining to civil and social rights, 
which undoubtedly reflect on the right to health, as 
well as the government’s substitutional power which is 
provided for in art. 120 Const.?
Perhaps the problem is to guarantee the success, 
meaning the application, of this principle?
On the matter of healthcare, the State must de-
fine everything that is fundamental (eg: the therapeu-
tic purpose of a practice or a medicine), using scien-
tific, not political, criteria (in the hopes that it uses 
competent authorities for this purpose).
On the other hand, everything that of an organi-
zational or technical nature (eg: the identification of 
bodies and procedures) should be defined by the Re-
gions, which can meet the needs of local communi-
ties more realistically. Perhaps the same doubt had also 
risen in the mind of the legislative reformer, who had 
foreseen the possibility for Regions to be given legisla-
tive powers (though these were limited to the “gen-
eral and common rules” of social policies) as well as 
the ability to delegate regulatory powers in all matters 
which were under the competence of the State. 
Perhaps these were to be considered the new safe-
guard clauses of a basically “state-centric” system and 
not so much the “new” powers of State intervention. 
 However you want to interpret it, this reform 
would have undermined the principle of subsidiarity, 
and it is not unlikely that this could have resulted in 
the proliferation of appeals at national (because the 
Constitution would continue to support the principle 
of subsidiarity) and EU level.
To this picture we must add what appeared to be 
mere declarations of intent, or broad guidelines, on the 
new role of the Senate: yes, it should represent the in-
terests of local institutions, but, in the absence of a law 
on how its members would be appointed and the kind 
of power that it would wield, every attempt to interpre-
tet it is purely a useless, dogmatic risk. The legislator 
would still have had to take this innovation into consid-
eration, as the reform intended for the “new” Senate to 
become a place in which local interests were combined.
M. Siracusa, I. Grappasonni, F. Petrelli356
Legislative reactions after the rejection of the reform. 
Conclusions
For the purposes of this study, it seems that the 
proposed reform intended to: reduce spending; guar-
antee the homogeneity of the right to health on a na-
tional level (by overcoming differences between Re-
gions and local health agencies thereby dissuading the 
practice of “health tourism”); reduce existing conflicts 
of competence between the State and Regions; achieve 
the more efficient and legitimate representation of lo-
cal needs in the new Senate.
However, our analysis shows that the proposed 
reform, might not have been effective, due to the na-
ture of the legal instruments utilized; this could have 
provoked an unnecessary legislative activity (particu-
larly in the field of healthcare). There is no doubt, 
however, that had it been approved, the reform would 
have been yet another legislative proposal devoid of 
consistency and coherence. In truth, the legal system 
pertaining to healthcare/pharmaceutical care is cur-
rently undergoing a profound transformation, which 
is being achieved through other laws that, prior to the 
referendum, legislators were trying, with great diffi-
culty, to make compatible with the reform itself. 
Before the reform was rejected by popular vote, 
the possibility of finding the funding needed for the 
final approval, after 15 years, of the essential levels of 
care (LEC) (6) was being discussed. The Ministerial 
Decree relating to pharmaceutical care issued on Janu-
ary 12, 2017, introduces some new features (compared 
to the now obsolete LEC which were in force until 
today): the variety of distribution channels (via affili-
ated pharmacies, direct distribution and on account of 
public or private pharmacies) and the aformentioned 
multi-service pharmacy (7). For years, these have been 
a significant innovation, that has not yet come into full 
effect: the pharmacy is a primary point of reference for 
the protection of the patient’s right to health by ensur-
ing not only rights of access to the drug, but a broader 
right of access to care, placing itself as an intermediary 
between State and patient. As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, this type of pharmacy would not be limited 
to pharmaceutical care, but its role would include all 
aspects of healthcare, in the same way as other health-
care facilities. In this decree, the introduction of a spe-
cific National Commission for guaranteeing LEC is of 
great importance. This will be responsible, for updat-
ing the essential levels of assistance each year; equally 
important is the creation of a task force composed of 
various organs (Ministry of Health, Institute of High-
er Health, Italian Medicines Agency AIFA, National 
Agency for Regional Health Services and NAS) with 
the task of monitoring the implementation of LEC 
at Regional level, with the Regions having to sub-
mit a quarterly report to the Ministry of Health. All 
this seems, of course, aimed at guaranteeing that the 
LEC will be applied consistently in different Regions, 
avoiding unacceptable differences (might it be that the 
rejection of the reform has influenced this choice?). 
However, the Regions are not totally convinced that all 
the services that they will have to provide come under 
the estimated financial budget. This matter is currently 
undergoing change.
In fact, the LEC must be interpreted by taking 
another important law, passed at the start of the year, 
into consideration: the 2017 Budget Law. The right to 
health, has always been considered against other inter-
ests, particularly of an economic and financial nature. 
In this law, the State has lumped everything to-
gether and inserted hospital spending (both direct 
spending and public and private expenditure carried 
out by pharmacies) under “pharmaceutical expenditure 
- direct purchases”.
In addition, the ceiling on expenditure has been 
fixed at a lower level than conventional pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure (which, in the estimated budget law, 
only includes distribution by way of public and private 
pharmacies). It is the Regions themselves that have 
questioned this mechanism (one doubt was expressed 
together with the Italian Society of Hospital Pharma-
cists, SIFO), wondering whether it won’t actually lead 
them to spend more, even only because they will ex-
ceed the spending limit imposed on direct purchases, 
forcing them to go through standard healthcare pro-
cedures which are more costly. It should also be con-
sidered that spending on cancer drugs and innovative 
drugs that are not included in the funding that has 
been specifically allocated for them is also included in 
the ceiling for direct purchases. Even these profiles, 
however, are constantly changing, since the Budget 
Law makes a reference to a future Ministerial Decree 
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and a future determination by AIFA, concerning the 
allocation of the resources mentioned (to date, two 
funds have been established for innovative cancer 
drugs and innovative drugs) and for determining the 
criteria for classifying a drug as innovative respectively, 
the Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA) is the nation-
al authority responsible for the regulation of drugs 
in Italy. It is a public body operating autonomously, 
transparently and in a cost-effective manner, under the 
direction of the Ministry of Health and the vigilance 
of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Econ-
omy. It cooperates with the Regional Authorities, the 
National Institute of Health, Research Institutes, Pa-
tients’ Associations, Health Professionals, Scientific 
Associations, the Pharmaceutical Industry, producers 
and distributors.
But that is not all. After the constitutional reform 
was rejected, at the end of the year, at the same time as 
the latest discussions on the Budget Law were being 
held, AIFA lifted one of its own determinations, no. 
458 of 2016, which defined the criteria for therapeutic 
equivalence evaluations. This determination had facili-
tated Regional centralized purchasing of drugs which 
were therapeutically equivalent but had different active 
ingredients. These procedures had long been criticized 
by Farmindustria (which felt this debased the hard-
ships and costs associated with research), by doctors’ 
associations (who complained of having to limit issu-
ing prescriptions) and by the patients themselves (who 
worried, especially when affected by chronic diseases, 
about the continuity of their care). Obviously, this 
regional practice appeared to be aimed exclusively at 
curbing costs. Recently, a ruling of the Piedmontese 
Regional Administrative Court (published 16 March 
2017) (8) rejected a law issued by the Region of Pied-
mont which encouraged the purchase of medicines 
with broad therapeutic equivalence, recognizing that 
the power to define the criteria for determining equiv-
alency belongs exclusively to AIFA and that, in any 
case, doctors’ freedom to write prescriptions and the 
patients’ right to health cannot be limited. 
In revoking the aforementioned determination, 
AIFA expressed a wish for objective procedures, made 
between the State (Ministry and AIFA) and Regions, 
to be adopted swiftly. A wish that uniform legislation 
be guaranteed at national level and, so far, apparently a 
victory in the need to balance the right to health with 
economic interests.
There are issues of agreement between the State 
and Regions when it comes to the purchase of drugs, 
too. These are caused by the division of legislative pow-
ers in the health sector that the rejected constitutional 
reform aimed to solve. Purchasing suffers from exces-
sive fragmentation of demand (lots of medicines pur-
chased by individual Regions, individual local health 
agencies or even individual health centres or hospitals), 
and it is also affected by differences in terms of the fi-
nancial resources available to the buying public. This 
therefore creates additional differences between the 
Regions and even between individual hospitals in the 
same Region, which also have a negative impact on the 
distribution of medicines (for example, even the supply 
of products to pharmacies that operate on behalf of the 
local health authority depends on these public tenders). 
Indeed, in 2014 there was a first national attempt 
at centralizating purchasing, by including medicines 
in the list of products for which centralized pur-
chasing needs to be guaranteed by CONSIP, a pub-
lic stock company owned by the Italian Ministry of 
Economy and Financ, (its procedures are specifically 
aimed at guaranteeing that the conditions set out in 
the offers were equal). CONSIP’s operations clearly 
suffer from a lack of surveillance: after recent serious 
legal proceedings, its reliability in society and among 
local authorities has practically vanished (9). In fact, 
it recently raised the alarm (10) about public tenders 
which had no participants, when they were held for 
individual hospitals, specifically for the direct distribu-
tion of drugs. In these cases, the problem of having 
to apply the lowest price is evident, and is repeatedly 
challenged by pharmaceutical companies that consid-
er it to go against practices of fair competition. They 
would like to replace it with the most economically 
advantageous offer. In actual fact, the 2016 Public Pro-
curement Code cites this as being the basis of all public 
tenders, reserving the lowest price to exceptional situ-
ations. These are, nonetheless, precisely set out in the 
“standardized purchasing or special market situations” 
and it seems complicated not to include the purchase 
of some, if not all pharmaceutical products in this 
statement. Finally, it should be noted that innovations 
to competition in the pharmaceutical sector are not 
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a being fought over by State and Regional powers. It 
seems the innovations will come into being very soon 
thanks to the much-discussed decree on competition 
(the approval of which was postponed because of the 
referendum).
This will affect the legal standing of private phar-
macies with the introduction of capital, namely that a 
limited company can have members who are not neces-
sarily pharmacists (the battleground refers to the lim-
its that must be imposed, probably by identifying the 
highest number of pharmacies that can be managed by 
a limited company on a regional or national territory). 
The pinnacle of competitiveness applied, however, to 
pharmaceutical products which are not simply mer-
chandise but part of healthcare. And though the con-
stitutional reform, which added “promotion” as well as 
the “protection” of competition to State competence, 
was rejected, it appears that it has nonetheless not been 
ignored by the State and the Regions, whose local au-
thorities, have sold their shares in public pharmacies in 
favour of private pharmacies, finding in this way a very 
profitable way to raise funds.
In conclusion, based on what has been said, at 
least two profiles emerge: the protection of the right 
to health and the division of powers between the State 
and Regions.
Too often, the right to health, and especially the 
right to health and pharmaceutical care, suffers from 
interests that are purely financial. As pharmacies be-
come sales outlets, like shops, their potential to become 
the first place to which the patient turns (something 
which has partly been achieved thanks to their mil-
lennial tradition) is denied. The patient should not be 
seen as a customer (and he should not feel like one) but 
should feel he can go to the pharmacy before having 
to consult hospitals, healthcare services, etc. So, fix-
ing our attention on the problem of distributing drugs, 
for example, for some of them, one of two things can 
be chosen: either by making it easier for the patient 
to get medicine from the hospital or through pharma-
cies that sell pharmaceutical products on behalf of the 
health authority (a process that is currently divided 
into many, complicated steps), or making medications 
directly available to the pharmacy, by giving the right 
of access to the patient’s medication precedence over 
everything else. 
And finally, the issue of State and Regional 
competences that intertwine and overlap: this prob-
ably does not depend exclusively on the powers they 
currently share in the healthcare sector but actually 
depends on the horizontal nature of the sector itself. 
Had the constitutional reform been approved, nothing 
would have changed: eliminating concurrent compe-
tences while leaving “the general and common pro-
visions for the protection of health” to the State and 
the “planning and organization of health services” to 
the Regions does not appear to be the most effective 
means to counter a problem that arises from the hori-
zontal nature of the matter (that and would have re-
mained so).
In a recent landmark ruling (11), the Constitu-
tional Court, declared the unconstitutionality of the 
founding principles of the enabling law on the reform 
of public administration, citing the argument based on 
the constitutional principle of loyal cooperation (12) 
between the central State and decentralized institutions 
(intimately connected to the principle of subsidiarity), 
on the basis of which, in order to make changes to this 
matter, the State would have to involve the Regions 
by asking for their agreement rather than the weaker 
method that is actually used: asking for their opinion. 
Perhaps that legal argument might be seen as an 
admonition for equality and unity? (13).
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